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Abstract
Recent literature has addressed how product creation amplies economic uctua-
tions via the love of variety. Yet, the empirical evidence on variety e¤ects is sparse.
The current paper demonstrates that a decreasing returns to scale production technol-
ogy, which leads to increasing marginal costs, can similarly amplify business cycles. An
expansion of the rms product scope reduces marginal costs and gives an incentive to
produce multiple products even if the variety e¤ects are entirely absent. The e¢ ciency
gains from adjusting product scopes makes the economy more susceptible to sunspot
equilibria.
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1 Introduction
An important line of research has demonstrated how product creation via the entry of rms
can amplify shocks and be a source of sunspot equilibria that leads to uctuations driven by
self-fullling beliefs. The two central mechanisms that produce these results are countercycli-
cal markups and the love of variety.1 More recently, Minniti and Turino (2013) and Pavlov
and Weder (2017) extend these entry models by utilizing variety e¤ects as an incentive for
rms to produce multiple products. Yet, the empirical evidence on the size of these e¤ects
is sparse - casting doubt on the ability of this mechanism to explain the contribution of
product creation on the business cycle. The current paper addresses this issue by laying out
a model where intra-rm product creation amplies business cycles and makes the economy
more susceptible to sunspot equilibria even in the complete absence of the love of variety.
Specically, it investigates the role of increasing marginal costs in a general equilibrium
model with endogenous entry and oligopolistic multi-product rms. When the production
technology of intermediate good rms has decreasing returns, marginal costs increase with
output per variety. This gives rms an incentive to produce multiple products even in the
absence of variety e¤ects. The e¢ ciency gains of adjusting product scopes amplies eco-
nomic uctuations and creates sunspot equilibria at more realistic situations, which are not
attainable with mono-product rms. Hence, technological decreasing returns and increasing
marginal costs provide a novel mechanism for product creation within rms and for generat-
ing indeterminacy. This is in stark contrast to Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and
Guo (1994), where indeterminacy is a result of technological increasing returns for mono-
product rms in the absence of entry. Finally, the model is simulated by belief (sunspot)
shocks and articial business cycles closely resemble empirically observed uctuations.
The way indeterminacy arises is most easily understood in terms of the equilibrium wage-
hours locus. Product creation and countercyclical markups generate an endogenous e¢ ciency
wedge which makes this locus upwardly sloping. If the locus is steeper than the labor supply
curve, then sunspots can act as self-fullling expectation shocks. For example, if people
become optimistic about the future path of income, then the wealth e¤ect shifts the labor
1For example, under the love of variety, Devereux et al. (1996) assess the e¤ect of technology shocks, while
Pavlov and Weder (2012) examine the conditions for local indeterminacy. Jaimovich (2007) investigates how
indeterminacy can be generated by oligopolistic rms with countercyclical markups.
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supply curve upwards, raising employment and output - thereby conrming the initial belief.
More precisely, when the labor supply curve shifts up due to optimistic expectations, the
higher demand for output and prot opportunities induce rm entry. Greater competition
pushes markups downwards and causes rms to expand output. Since marginal costs would
increase with production, rms choose to expand their product scopes rather than ramp up
the production of existing varieties. The fall in output per variety due to the cannibalization
e¤ect (new varieties reducing the demand for existing varieties) then leads to falling marginal
costs. Together, the e¢ ciency gains of product creation and falling markups shift out the
labor demand curve far enough to allow the initial belief about higher income to become
self-fullling.
The paper is most closely related to Pavlov and Weder (2017) who show that under the
love of variety, product scope adjustments within rms make the economy more susceptible
to sunspot equilibria. In a parallel framework, Minniti and Turino (2013) investigate the
magnication e¤ect on fundamental disturbances only. In contrast, the current paper does
not utilize variety e¤ects. Instead, increasing marginal costs are an incentive for rms to
expand their product scopes.
The focus on multi-product rms is motivated by recent empirical work. Bernard et al.
(2010) nd that about 90 percent of total sales in the manufacturing sector are made by
multi-product rms. Broda and Weinstein (2010) report that over 90 percent of product
creation and destruction occurs within rms and that the contribution of product scope
adjustments within rms is at least as important to the evolution of aggregate output as
rm entry and exit.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 analyzes the
local dynamics. Capital utilization is introduced in Section 4 and the model is simulated in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The articial economy is based on the multi-product models of Minniti and Turino (2013)
and Pavlov and Weder (2017). There are two key di¤erences. First, the love of variety e¤ects
are entirely absent in aggregating intermediate goods into nal goods. Second, a decreasing
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returns to scale production technology implies that marginal costs increase with production.
Firms therefore take into account the e¤ect of their product scope decision on marginal costs.
2.1 Final goods
Final output, Yt, is produced under perfect competition using the range of intermediate
inputs supplied by Mt multi-product rms. This is done via two nested CES aggregators.
The rst combines the varieties from an individual rm
Yt(i) = Nt(i)
1
1 
 Z Nt(i)
0
yt(i; j)
 1
 dj
! 
 1
 > 1 (1)
where Nt(i) is rm is product scope, yt(i; j) is the amount of the unique intermediate good
j produced by rm i, and  is the elasticity of substitution. The rm-composite goods are
then aggregated to form the nal good
Yt =M
1
1 
t
 
MtX
i=1
Yt(i)
 1

! 
 1
: (2)
Note that the CES aggregators have been formed to eliminate the love of variety.2 Hence,
unlike in Minniti and Turino (2013) and Pavlov and Weder (2017) where variety e¤ects
were necessary for the existence of multi-product rms, the current model has no increasing
returns in the aggregation of products.
The prot maximization problem yields
yt(i; j) =

pt(i; j)
Pt
 
Yt
MtNt(i)
(3)
where the aggregate price index satises
Pt =M
1
 1
t
 
MtX
i=1
Pt(i)
1 
! 1
1 
: (4)
In addition, we have the price index for rm is goods
Pt(i) = Nt(i)
1
 1
 Z Nt(i)
0
pt(i; j)
1 dj
! 1
1 
: (5)
2As we will see later, an intermediate good rm will charge the same price for all of its varieties and
produce them in equal quantities. Together with the elimination of the love of variety, this implies that
di¤erences in intra-rm and inter-rm elasticities of substitution are irrelevant for dynamics.
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2.2 Intermediate good rms
Each rm chooses the number of di¤erent products to produce and the prices to sell them
at. This task is solved in two stages. In the rst, rms decide their product scopes. In the
second stage, rms act as Bertrand competitors in the product market and set their prices.
The model is solved by backward induction using the subgame Nash perfect equilibrium
concept. The number of active rms is determined by a zero-prot condition each period.
Since all rms have the same technology and behavior is governed by identical optimality
conditions, a symmetric Nash equilibrium emerges.
Intermediate goods are produced using capital, kt(i; j), and labor, ht(i; j), that are sup-
plied on perfectly competitive factor markets. The production technology has decreasing
returns and involves two xed costs. The variety-level xed cost, , restricts the amount of
varieties a rm will produce. The rm-level xed cost, f , provides economies of scope and
determines the number of active rms via a zero-prot condition. Hence, a rms output is
given byZ Nt(i)
0
yt(i; j)dj =
Z Nt(i)
0

(kt(i; j)
ht(i; j)
1 )    dj   f 0 <  < 1: (6)
The presence of decreasing returns via 0 <  < 1 makes it protable for rms to produce
multiple products. Each rm sets prices to maximizes prots
t(i) =
Z Nt(i)
0
pt(i; j)yt(i; j)  wtht(i; j)  rtkt(i; j)dj (7)
where wt and rt are the labor and capital rental rates. As in Yang and Heijdra (1993),
intermediate good rms are large enough to take the aggregate price index into consideration
when making their pricing decision.3 Appendix A.1 shows that a rm charges the same price,
pt(i), for all of its varieties and the markup becomes
t(i) 
pt(i)
mct(i)
=
[1  t(i)]
[1  t(i)]  1
where mct(i) is the marginal cost and t(i)  Pt(i)Yt(i)=(PtYt) is rm is market share which
increases in the number of goods Nt(i). In contrast to Minniti and Turino (2013) and others,
this does not arise from the love of variety but instead is due to the e¤ect of the product
3Under monopolistic competition where rms take the aggregate price index as given, the markup and
product scope are constant over the business cycle (see Appendix A.3).
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scope on the rms marginal costs. If the production technology had constant returns to
scale (minus the xed costs), the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of a variety
would be independent of the scale of production. Firms would take the marginal cost as given
when making their product scope decisions. Prots would be decreasing in Nt(i) because
of the variety-level xed cost, ; and rms would only produce a single product. However,
since the production technology has decreasing returns, the marginal cost is increasing in
the scale of production:
mct(i) =

yt(i) + +
f
Nt(i)
 1 
 w1 t r

t
(1  )1  :
Firms then need to take into account how an introduction of a new product a¤ects marginal
costs through the demand for their varieties.
Firms determine their optimal number of products by maximizing prots with respect
to Nt(i) by taking into account the e¤ect on its own and other rmspricing decisions (see
Appendix A.2). The rst-order condition is
mct(i) =
 
1   + 

pt(i) mct(i)
pt(i)
2!
PtYt
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
(8)
 [Nt(i)+ f ]
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
+ Ytt(i)

pt(i) mct(i)
pt(i)

@Pt
@Nt(i)
Firms equate the cost of producing a new variety (the left-hand side) with the gains on the
right-hand side. The rst two terms on the right-hand side are due to the presence of decreas-
ing returns: introducing a new product increases the rms market share, @t(i)=@Nt(i) > 0,
due to the e¤ect on marginal costs, @mct(i)=@Nt(i) < 0. The last term represents that
introducing a new product reduces the aggregate price index, @Pt=@Nt(i) < 0, which from
(3) leads to a lower demand for rm is products.
2.3 Symmetric equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, each rm produces the same number of varieties, Nt(i) = Nt,
charges the same price, pt(i) = pt, and has the same market share t(i) = 1=Mt. With the
nal good as the numeraire, Pt = 1, and from (4) and (5), pt = Pt. Using (1) and (2), output
per variety is
yt =
Yt
NtMt
: (9)
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The markup simplies to
t =
(Mt   1)
(Mt   1) Mt : (10)
Since new entrants reduce rmsmarket shares, the markup is countercyclical. Note that as
the number of rms becomes large, the steady state markup converges to its monopolistic
competition level of  = =(   1): Furthermore, the steady state version of this equation
can be written as
M = 1 +

(   1)  
and calibrating the steady state markup  and elasticity  pins down the number of rms.
An increase in the rms product scope reduces its own price and the prices of other rms:
to lower price competition, rms under-expand their product scopes in comparison to the
case of monopolistic competition where such strategic linkages are absent. The extent of this
under-expansion can be seen by substituting @t(i)=@Nt(i); @mct(i)=@Nt(i) and @Pt=@Nt(i)
into (8) and rearranging for the product scope:
Nt =
1  

t

Yt
Mt
t:
The function t (see Appendix A.2) is less than one and is increasing in Mt: the strategic
e¤ect of the product scope decision becomes less important as the number of rms increases
and this gives an incentive to introduce new varieties. When Mt becomes very large this
term approaches unity and the markup converges to its monopolistic competition level of
=(   1). Intuitively, as the number of rms grows, the impact on the market share of
adding an additional variety becomes smaller, which has then a smaller impact on the price
of the variety. The dynamics of the product scope are thus similar to Pavlov and Weder
(2017), but instead of the love of variety being the incentive for product creation, it is the
e¢ ciency gains of reducing marginal costs. When rms want to expand their output it is
e¢ cient to introduce new products, rather than ramp up the production of existing varieties
whose production technology is subject to diminishing returns.
The number of rms can be determined from the zero prot condition:
Mt =
t   

Yt
Nt + f
(11)
To obtain aggregate output, rst note that (6) can be written as
yt = k

t h
(1 )
t    
f
Nt
:
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Using this together with (9) and (11) gives
Yt = 
M1 t N
1 
t
t
Kt H
(1 )
t (12)
where Kt =MtNtkt and Ht =MtNtkt. The term
M1 t N
1 
t
t
can be interpreted as an endoge-
nous e¢ ciency wedge. Combining (11) and (12), output can be written as
Yt =

t
Kt H
1 
t

1  
t
 1 


Nt
Nt + f
 1 

: (13)
Since markups are countercyclical, the rst term in brackets implies that decreasing returns
( < 1) have a contractionary e¤ect on the e¢ ciency wedge. However, the second term in
brackets implies that an increase in product scopes has an expansionary e¤ect. This latter
e¤ect outweighs the former and as we will see in Section 3, procyclical product scope makes
the economy more susceptible to sunspot equilibria. Finally, the equilibrium real wage and
rental rate are given by
wt = (1  ) Yt
Ht
and rt = 
Yt
Kt
:
2.4 Agents
The representative agent derives lifetime utility from the function
U =
Z 1
0
e tu(Ct; Ht)dt  > 0:
Here,  denotes the subjective rate of time preference and period utility takes the functional
form
u(Ct; Ht) = lnCt   H
1+
t
1 + 
 > 0,   0
where  is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. The agents own the capital stock
and sell labor and capital services. The period budget is constrained by
wtHt + rtKt +t  Xt + Ct
where t denotes potential prots and investment, Xt, is added to the capital stock such
that:
_Kt = Xt   Kt 0 <  < 1:
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Time derivatives are denoted by dots and  stands for the constant rate of physical depreci-
ation of the capital stock. The solution to the maximization problem gives
Ht =
wt
Ct
(14)
and 
Ct
Ct
= rt      : (15)
Equation (14) describes the agentsleisure-consumption trade-o¤, while (15) is the intertem-
poral Euler equation. In addition the transversality condition must hold.
3 Dynamics
This section analyzes the local dynamic properties of the multi-product model and com-
pares it to the mono-product model. The equilibrium conditions are log-linearized and the
dynamical system is arranged to 
_Kt=Kt
_Ct=Ct

= J

K^t
C^t

:
Hatted variables denote percent deviations from their steady-state values and J is the 2 2
Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives. Note that Ct is a non-predetermined variable and
that Kt is predetermined. Indeterminacy requires both roots of J to be negative, that is
DetJ>0>TrJ. For easier comparison to previous studies, the parameters are calibrated at a
quarterly frequency as  = 0:3,  = 0:01,  = 0:025 and  = 0.
As explained in the previous section, the current model requires decreasing returns, 0 <
 < 1; for rms to have an incentive to produce multiple products. Figure 1 presents the
indeterminacy zones for the mono-product model with  = 1 and the multi-product model
with  = 0:8 and 0.9, which is consistent with the evidence in Burnside (1996). The mono-
product model is virtually identical to Jaimovich (2007) if, in his paper, the intersectoral
elasticity of substitution is set to unity. Indeterminacy is driven entirely by the e¤ect of the
countercyclical markup on the e¢ ciency wedge. While not shown in the gure, decreasing
returns in the mono-product model reduce the plausibility of indeterminacy. The reason is
that falling markups increase the output of rms and then the diminishing returns have a
negative e¤ect on the e¢ ciency wedge (recall the rst bracketed term in equation 13). As 
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Figure 1: Mono and multi-product models. Shaded regions represent areas of indeterminacy.
falls towards =(   1) the number of rms approaches innity and the markup converges
to its monopolistic competition level of =(   1): In this case, the markup is constant, the
dynamics converge to that of the model with monopolistic competition, and indeterminacy
cannot exist. Higher ; on the other hand, increases the cyclicality of the markup and
indeterminacy is thus possible for a lower level of market power.
When decreasing returns are present, marginal costs increase with output per variety
and rms have an incentive to produce multiple products. Here, decreasing returns amplify
uctuations and reduce the level of market power required for indeterminacy. This stands
completely in contrast to how decreasing returns a¤ect the mono-product model. Why is
this the case? First, note that if markups were constant, the product scope, output per rm
and output per variety would also be constant:  would have no e¤ect on local dynamics (see
Appendix A.3). Under oligopolistic competition, however, the entry of new rms reduces
existing rmsmarket shares and encourages them to expand their product scopes. Due
to the cannibalization e¤ect (new products reducing demand for existing products), rms
reduce production for each of their varieties, which then reduces their marginal costs. This
e¢ ciency gain - rms do not run into diminishing returns as quickly as their mono-product
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counterparts - acts as an additional mechanism that amplies business cycles. That is, a
low number of rms leads to two ine¢ ciencies: high markups and low product scopes (with
high output per variety). Firm entry reduces these ine¢ ciencies and expands production
possibilities.
4 Capital utilization
The last section has demonstrated that when production technologies have diminishing re-
turns, the possibility of sunspot equilibria increases when rms can choose their product
scopes. However, it could be argued that the level of market power required for indetermi-
nacy is on the higher end of empirical estimates. This section addresses the issue by showing
that the levels of market power can be reduced substantially by introducing variable capital
utilization. Each intermediate good rm i now operates the production technologyZ Nt(i)
0
yt(i; j)dj =
Z Nt(i)
0

(Ut kt(i; j)
ht(i; j)
1 )    dj   f
where Ut stands for the utilization rate of capital set by its owners. Capital evolves according
to
_Kt = Xt   tKt = Xt   1
%
U%t Kt % > 1:
and the optimal rate of utilization follows
rt = U
% 1
t :
The calibration remains the same, and as in Wen (1998), the steady state rst-order condi-
tions pin down % = (+ )= = 1:4: Figure 2 demonstrates how the introduction of variable
capital utilization signicantly reduces the level of market power and the elasticity of substi-
tution that are required for indeterminacy. This occurs because higher utilization, like lower
markups, increases the demand for labor.
To gain further understanding about the e¤ect of sunspots and the dynamics of the model,
the impulse responses of the main variables are plotted in Figure 3. The sunspot shock is
modelled as an expectation shock to consumption that raises it one percent above its steady
state level. This discrete-time version of the model is calibrated as  = 0:3,  = 0:025,
 = 0,  = 0:9; and a discount factor at   (1 + ) 1 = 0:99. The steady markup is
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Figure 2: Multi-product model with variable capital utilization,  = 0:9:
set to  = 1:3; which lies in the middle of value-added markup estimates for the US (see
Jaimovich, 2007). Finally, following Minniti and Turino (2013) and Pavlov and Weder (2017)
the elasticity of substitution is set to  = 7:5. The impulse response functions reveal that
both net product creation and net business formation positively comove with output, with
the former being more volatile than the latter. We can also observe the cannibalization e¤ect:
an introduction of a new variety reduces the demand for existing varieties, that is, output
per variety drops. The countercyclically uctuating markup, together with the e¢ ciency
gains of product creation on marginal costs leads to an upwardly sloping wage-hours locus
that enables the propagation of self-fullling beliefs described earlier.
5 Simulations
[This section is highly incomplete and subject to major revisions]
So far, this paper has shown that under increasing marginal costs, intra-rm product
creation can generate indeterminacy under more plausible situations. This remains the case
even if the love of variety - typically necessary for the existence of multi-product rms -
is entirely absent. The current section simulates the model to see if it can replicate the
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a consumption (sunspot) shock (percent deviations from the
steady state).
basic business cycle facts by comparing its second moments to the US quarterly time series
counterparts. Finally, a comparison is made to the model of Pavlov and Weder (2017) where
variety e¤ects drive the creation of products.
A discrete time version of the model with capital utilization is simulated by i.i.d. sunspot
shocks only. The calibration remains as in the previous section. Table 1 presents HP-ltered
second moments of the US data and of the articial economy. The model correctly repro-
duces the order of relative volatilities and positive correlations for the main macroeconomic
aggregates and the markup is strongly negatively correlated with output.4 The statistics for
the rm dynamics should be taken with a grain of salt as the data for net product creation
is limited to 2000:I 2003:IV, while the di¤erence between openings and closings of estab-
lishments provides only a crude measure of net business formation. Yet, the model does
well in replicating these observations. That is, both net product creation and net business
formation are positively correlated with output, with the former being more volatile than
4The low volatility of consumption is the consequence of the utilization margin and has been noted by
Jaimovich (2007) and Wen (1998). It can be shown that a steeper wage-hours locus via a lower  or a more
cyclical markup (higher  and/or ) improves the models performance in this aspect.
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the latter.
The last two columns of Table 1 present the second moments of the multi-product model
of Pavlov and Weder (2017). There are two main di¤erences from the current model. First,
there are no decreasing returns in production, i.e.  = 1. Second, the love of variety e¤ects
amplify uctuations. The inter-rm elasticity remains at  = 7:5 but the intra-rm elasticity
is  = 11:5 (following Broda and Weinsten, 2010) which imply variety e¤ects of 1=( 1) and
1=(  1): Apart from this, the calibration remains the same. To get a better understanding
of the workings of the model, the functional form of their CES aggregators imply that there
are increasing returns in the aggregation of products:
Yt =M
=( 1)
t N
=( 1)
t yt
and their aggregate production function can be written as
Yt =
M
1=( 1)
t N
1=( 1)
t
t
(UtKt)
H1 at :
As can be seen from the table, the model performs very comparably to the decreasing returns
economy. Since the two variety e¤ects produce a steeper wage-hours locus, this version of
the model does a slightly better job at matching the volatility of consumption. Overall, it
can be concluded that increasing marginal costs work similarly to the love of variety e¤ects
in a setting with multi-product rms.
Table 1
U.S. data Model ( = 0:9) PW (2017)
Variable x x=Y (x; Y ) x=Y (x; Y ) x=Y (x; Y )
output 1 1 1 1 1 1
consumption 0.39 0.82 0.09 0.78 0.19 0.97
investment 2.63 0.98 4.42 0.99 4.02 0.99
hours worked 0.83 0.86 0.93 0.99 0.82 0.99
net business formation 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.36
net product creation 1.08 0.42 0.67 0.28 0.88 0.36
markup - - 0.11 -1.00 0.08 -1.00
Y denotes the standard deviation of output and (x; Y ) is the correlation of variable x and output. See
Appendix A.4 for the source of US data. Net product creation data, limited to the period 2000:I to 2003:IV,
is from Broda and Weinstein (2010). Blank entries for the markup series are due to data unavailability.
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6 Conclusion
Previous studies have shown that product creation within rms can be a source of business
cycle amplication and sunspot equilibria. Yet, this result and the existence of multi-product
rms relies on the love of variety, for which empirical evidence is limited. The current paper
addresses this issue. It investigates the role of increasing marginal costs in a dynamic general
equilibrium model without the love of variety. Marginal costs increase with output per
variety due to decreasing returns in the production technology. Product scope expansions
then reduce marginal costs and rms have an incentive to produce multiple products. The
e¢ ciency gains of adjusting product scopes provides an amplication mechanism that creates
sunspot equilibria at more realistic situations, which are not attainable with mono-product
rms. Hence, increasing marginal costs provide a novel mechanism for product creation and
make it easier for indeterminacy to occur. The simulated indeterminate model generates
articial business cycles that closely resemble empirically observed uctuations.
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A Appendix
A.1 Markups
This Appendix derives the intermediate good rms optimal markup. Taking logs of (3)
gives
ln yt(i; j) =   ln pt(i; j) +  lnPt + lnYt   lnNt(i)  lnMt:
Then using (4) and (5), the price elasticity of demand is
@ ln yt(i; k)
@ ln pt(i; j)
=  |{z}
absent for k 6=j
+

Nt(i)Mt

pt(i; j)
Pt
1 
: (A.1)
Firm i maximizes prot (7) subject to the constraint (6):
L =
Z Nt(i)
0
pt(i; j)yt(i; j)  wtht(i; j)  rtkt(i; j)dj
+t
 Z Nt(i)
0

zt(kt(i; j)
ht(i; j)
1 )    dj   f   Z Nt(i)
0
yt(i; j)dj
!
:
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Optimality gives
@L
@pt(i; j)
= yt(i; j) +
Z Nt(i)
0
[pt(i; j)  t] @yt(i; j)
@pt(i; j)
dj = 0 (A.2)
@L
@ht(i; j)
=  wt + t(1  )ztkt(i; j)ht(i; j)(1 ) 1 = 0 (A.3)
@L
@kt(i; j)
=  rt + tztkt(i; j) 1ht(i; j)(1 ) = 0: (A.4)
The Lagrange multiplier, t; is obtained by combining (A.3) and (A.4) then applying Shep-
hards lemma, and amounts to the marginal cost, mct(i; j) of producing one more variety:
mct(i; j) =
 
ztkt(i; j)
ht(i; j)
(1 ) 1  w1 t rt
z
1

t (1  )1 
(A.5)
=

yt(i; j) + +
f
Nt(i)
 1 
 w1 t r

t
z
1

t (1  )1 
:
Substituting (A.1) into (A.2) and some algebra yields
yt(i; j)  yt(i; j)
pt(i; j)
[pt(i; j) mct(i; j)] +Z Nt(i)
0
yt(i; k)
pt(i; j)
[pt(i; k) mct(i; k)] dk 
Nt(i)Mt

pt(i; j)
Pt
1 
= 0
Substituting (3) for yt(i; j), the above equation simplies to
PtYt

1  pt(i; j) mct(i; j)
pt(i; j)

+ 
Z Nt(i)
0
yt(i; k) [pt(i; k) mct(i; k)] dk = 0
As the second term of this equation is the same for all j 2 [0; Nt(i)]; this implies that rm
i will charge the same price for all of its varieties.5 Hence, pt(i; j) = pt(i; k) = pt(i) = Pt(i)
and mct(i; j) = mct(i): Some algebra gives
t(i) 
pt(i)
mct(i)
=
[1  t(i)]
[1  t(i)]  1 : (A.6)
where
t(i) 

pt(i)
Pt
1 
M 1t =
Pt(i)Yt(i)
PtYt
(A.7)
is rm is market share.
5Marginal cost depends on the level of production if  6= 1 but note that each variety faces the same
demand curve.
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A.2 Product scope
This Appendix derives the rmsoptimal product scope assuming increasing marginal costs,
 < 1: Since the rm will charge the same price for all of its varieties, it will produce the
same quantity of each variety. Hence, the costs of production areZ Nt(i)
0
wtht(i; j) + rtkt(i; j)dj = Nt(i)mct(i)ztkt(i)
ht(i)
(1 )
= Nt(i)mct(i)yt(i) +Nt(i)+ f
Prots can then be written as
t(i) =

pt(i) mct(i)
pt(i)

PtYtt(i) mct(i)[Nt(i)+ f ]: (A.8)
Firm i takes the number of rms and their product scopes as given and maximizes its prots
with respect to Nt(i) by taking account the e¤ect of its product scope decision on its own and
all other producersprices and marginal costs.6 After some algebra, the rst-order condition
is
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
=
 
1   + 

pt(i) mct(i)
pt(i)
2!
PtYt
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
 mct(i) (A.9)
+Ytt(i)

pt(i) mct(i)
pt(i)

@Pt
@Nt(i)
  [Nt(i)+ f ]
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
= 0:
Now to derive @t(i)=@Nt(i), @Pt=@Nt(i); @mct(i)=@Nt(i); then substitute in (A.9) to obtain
rm is product scope. From (A.7):
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
= (1  ) t(i)
pt(i)
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)
+ (   1)t(i)
Pt
@Pt
@Nt(i)
: (A.10)
Note that the second term on the right hand side of (A.10) would not be present in the case
of monopolistic competition. As will be shown later, @pt(i)=@Nt(i) and @Pt=@Nt(i) are both
negative. From (A.6):
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)
=
t(i)[t(i)  1]mct(i)
1  t(i)
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
+ t(i)
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
: (A.11)
Since pt(i) = Pt(i); the aggregate price index can be written as
Pt =M
1
 1
t
 
MtX
k=1
pt(k)
1 
! 1
1 
6Note that from (A.5) if  6= 1 then the rm internalises the e¤ect of the product scope on its marginal
costs.
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and
@Pt
@Nt(i)
= P tM
 1
t
"
MtX
k=1
pt(k)
  @pt(k)
@Nt(i)
#
: (A.12)
Under symmetry where all rms start o¤ identical with pt(i) = pt(k) = pt; this is equal to
@Pt
@Nt(i)
=

pt
Pt
 
M 1t

(Mt   1)@pt(k)
@Nt(i)
+
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)

(A.13)
and using (A.11) can be written as7
@Pt
@Nt(i)
=

pt
Pt
 
t
Mt

(Mt   1)@mct(k)
@Nt(i)
+
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)

(A.14)
From (A.5)8
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
=
1  

mct(i)

yt(i) + +
f
Nt(i)
 1

  yt(i)
Nt(i)
  yt(i)
pt(i)
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)
+ 
yt(i)
Pt
@Pt
@Nt(i)
  f
Nt(i)2

@mct(k)
@Nt(i)
=
1  

mct(k)

yt(k) + +
f
Nt(k)
 1

 yt(k)
pt(k)
@pt(k)
@Nt(i)
+ 
yt(k)
Pt
@Pt
@Nt(i)

Now assuming symmetry, setting the price index as the numeraire Pt = pt = 1; and using
(A.13):
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
=
1  

mct

yt + +
f
Nt
 1

  yt
Nt
  f
Nt2
+ yt

Mt   1
Mt
@pt(k)
@Nt(i)
+
1 Mt
Mt
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)

@mct(k)
@Nt(i)
=
1  

mct

yt + +
f
Nt
 1
yt

  1
Mt
@pt(k)
@Nt(i)
+
1
Mt
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)

Now use these in (A.14) to get
@Pt
@Nt(i)
=
1
Mt
   1


yt + +
f
Nt
 1
yt
Nt
+
f
Nt2

7Note that
MtX
k=1
t(k) = 1: Then
MtX
k=1
@t(k)
@Nt(i)
= 0, which under symmetry is (Mt   1) @t(k)@Nt(i) +
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
= 0:
8Since the marginal cost and price is the same for all rm is varieties, yt(i; j) = yt(i; k) = yt(i):
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Manipulating the symmetric equilibrium version of the zero prot condition (A.8) gives
MtNt+fMt
Yt
= t

  1: Then, noting that yt = YtMtNt the above simplies to
@Pt
@Nt(i)
=
(   1)(1 + ft )
tMtNt
< 0 (A.15)
where ft  fMtYt is the share of rm-level xed costs in nal output. Similar to the models
with the love of variety, an expansion of the product scope reduces the aggregate price index.
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
can be rearranged to
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
=
   1
2t

1
Nt
+ 
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)
   @Pt
@Nt(i)
+ ft
1
Nt

(A.16)
The next step is to nd @pt(i)
@Nt(i)
: Combining (A.10) and (A.11):
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)
=
t(i)[t(i)  1]mct(i)
1  t(i)

(1  ) t(i)
pt(i)
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)
+ (   1)t(i)
Pt
@Pt
@Nt(i)

+ t(i)
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
Applying symmetry with t(i) = 1=Mt and some algebra gives
@pt(i)
@Nt(i)
=
Mt +
(t 1)( 1)
Mt 1 +
(1 )
t
1 + (t 1)( 1)
Mt 1 +
(1 )
t
@Pt
@Nt(i)
< 0: (A.17)
Hence, @pt(i)
@Nt(i)
< @Pt
@Nt(i)
< 0: From (A.10) and (A.11) it is now clear that @t(i)
@Nt(i)
> 0 and
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
< 0: An expansion of the product scope reduces the prices of the rms varieties and
increases its market share. This stands in contrast to Pavlov and Weder (2017) where due to
the love of variety, the rm would increase its prices. Using (A.10), under symmetry (A.9)
can be written as
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
=
 
1   + 

1  1
t
2!
(1  ) @pt(i)
@Nt(i)
+ (   1) @Pt
@Nt(i)

+

1  
t

@Pt
@Nt(i)
  (t   )
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
   1
t
Mt
Yt
= 0:
Finally, (A.15), (A.16), (A.17), and (10) are used in the above to solve for the product scope:
Nt =
1  

t

Yt
Mt
"
1 + ft
t

1  1
Mt
  (Mt   1)[(Mt   1) Mt]
Mt([(Mt   1) Mt][(Mt   1)(   1)  Mt]  )
#
(A.18)
Reminiscent of Pavlov and Weder (2017), the big term in square brackets is less than one
and is increasing in Mt (converging to unity as the number of rms becomes very large).
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An increase in the rms product scope reduces its marginal costs and prices. Other rms
respond by reducing their prices and to lower this price competition rms under-expand
their product scopes relative to the case of monopolistic competition where such strategic
interactions are absent. This strategic e¤ect diminishes as the number of rms increases and
this gives an incentive to introduce new varieties. Recall the share of xed costs in nal
output:
t 
MtNt + fMt
Yt
=
t

  1:
Then, t = 
f
t +
v
t together with (A.18) solves for 
f
t  fMt=Yt and vt  MtNt=Yt: As
the number of rms becomes very large these cost shares approach the levels in the monopo-
listic competition version of the model (see Appendix A.3). As the markup is countercyclical,
it is clear that @=@M < 0: It can also be shown that @f=@M < 0 and @v=@M > 0: Firm
entry leads to an expansion of product scopes and increases the variety level xed costs as a
fraction of total output.
A.3 Monopolistic competition
This Appendix shows that under monopolistic competition, markups and the product scope
are constant over the business cycle. When rms are too small to inuence the aggregate
price index, Pt; the last term in (A.1) is absent and the markup is constant at  = =( 1):
Prots can be written as
t(i) =
  

PtYtt(i) mct(i)(Nt(i)+ f )
where the market share is
t(i) =

mct(i)
Pt
1 
M 1t
The rst-order condition is
@t(i)
@Nt(i)
=  


  

PtYt
t(i)
pt(i)
+ (Nt(i)+ f )

@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
 mct(i) = 0
and from (A.5)
@mct(i)
@Nt(i)
=
 

yt(i)
Nt(i)
+
f
Nt(i)2

mct(i)

1 

yt(i) + +
f
Nt(i)

+ yt(i)
:
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Clearly, if 0 <  < 1; then @pt(i)
@Nt(i)
= @mct(i)
@Nt(i)
< 0. As in the previous section,
MtNt+fMt
Yt
=


 1 is obtained from the zero prot condition. Then, putting these together under symmetry
and some algebra gives
vt =




  1

1 + ft


1  + 
(A.19)
where once again ft  fMtYt and vt 
MtNt
Yt
: With constant markups and zero prots each
period, these cost shares are constant each period. Using (A.19) and ft + 
v
t =


  1 then
gives ft =   1 and vt =    : Since ft is constant, the number of rms is proportional
to nal output and the product scope is constant:
N =
1  



Yt
Mt
=
1  


  1
f

:
Parameter  has no e¤ect on local dynamics as output per rm and output per variety are
constant. The dynamics of the model are identical to the constant markup mono-product
model in Pavlov and Weder (2012) without the love of variety e¤ects. Hence, indeterminacy
cannot arise in this version of the model.
A.4 Data sources
This Appendix details the source and construction of the U.S. data used in Section 5. All
data is quarterly and for the period 1967:I-2010:IV.
1. Personal Consumption Expenditures, Nondurable Goods. Seasonally adjusted at
annual rates, billions of dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5.
2. Personal Consumption Expenditures, Services. Seasonally adjusted at annual rates,
billions of dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5.
3. Personal Consumption Expenditures, Durable Goods. Seasonally adjusted at annual
rates, billions of dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5.
4. Gross Private Domestic Investment. Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, billions of
dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5.
5. Gross Domestic Product. Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, billions of dollars.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5.
6. Gross Domestic Product. Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, billions of chained
(2005) dollars. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.6.
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7. Nonfarm Business Hours. Index 2005=100, seasonally adjusted. Source: Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Series Id: PRS85006033.
8. Civilian Noninstitutional Population. 16 years and over, thousands. Source: Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Series Id: LNU00000000Q.
9. GDP Deator = (5)=(6):
10. Real Per Capita Consumption, Ct = [(1) + (2)]=(9)=(8):
11. Real Per Capita Investment, Xt = [(3) + (4)]=(9)=(8):
12. Real Per Capita Output, Yt = (10) + (11):
13. Per Capita Hours Worked, Ht = (7)=(8):
14. Total Private Openings, Number of Establishments, Rate (Percent). Source: Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Series Id: BDS0000000000000000120003RQ5.
15. Total Private Closings, Number of Establishments, Rate (Percent). Source: Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Series Id: BDS0000000000000000120006LQ5.
16. Net business formation, (14)  (15):
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